Demonstration Module 1
COURSE OBJECTIVES:
Upon the completion of Course Demonstration Module #1, you will have a better understanding of the complexity of decision-making under stressful conditions, such as planning an invasion of a nearby country. The resulting unintended consequences of poor planning resulting from a lack of information will also be apparent and be due to decisions made in haste by a limited number of poorly informed individuals. You will also be better prepared to:
– State the precise errors made by Soviet decision-makers involved in ordering the Soviet Army to intervene in Afghanistan.
– Prove that prior experiences, both successes and failures, and political ambitions have great influence upon individual positions that are staked out and defended during deliberations.
– Apply the acquired knowledge to similar situations you may encounter in your daily work.
– Decide when a particular aspect of the individual competition found in bureaucratic politics applies to an analysis you are called upon to make.
LEARNING OBJECTIVES:
Take-Aways
Large organizations frequently rely upon solutions used to resolve former problems when facing new, similar challenges. In the case of Afghanistan, Lenoid Brezhnev increasingly began to rely on the advice of Yuri Andropov, his KGB chief, while disregarding the advice of military planners from within the Ministry of Defense. The solutions Andropov advocated were based on his experience in the successful Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) in which Soviet combat troops were utilized successfully to quell what the Soviets viewed as “secessionist,” As a result, intervention was the primary tactic that was considered by the Soviet leadership. What were some of the basic differences between Hungary and Czechoslovakia that the Soviets failed to take into consideration?
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan began with a Special Operations assault into President Amin’s palace in a “decapitation” operation that was intended to support an “Afghan coup” by Amin’s political opponents. As the “intelligence plan” began to fall apart, the Soviet contingency plan — an invasion by conventional Red Army troops — began to materialize as conventional forces crossed the border. Since the Red Army followed standardized planning, they were soon involved in a conventional war against guerrilla forces. Rather than follow military bureaucratic planning that allowed for the capture and occupation of large population centers, what alternate plans might have been considered? How did the Soviet experience differ from U.S. and NATO operations?
Brezhnev was advised by his “small Politboro,” a four-man group, during the decision-making process that led to the decision that led to the Soviet invasion. The members of this group were were also political opponents involved in bureaucratic maneuvering as they sought to replace the ill and aging Brezhnev once he passed away. Do you see parallels to more recent invasion planning? History and geography are important considerations when planning. How should the “small Politboro” have conducted the internal debate that led to the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan? How did this decision impact the current political and military situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
The Soviets seem to have moved into Afghanistan out of fear that the Cold War Balance of Power with the United States was shifting against them. Egypt and Somalia were gone as allies and Afghanistan might have been the next former ally to expell Russians. Do you think the Soviets were experiencing group paranoia or had legitimate worries during this period of their history? Does this tell us anything about Russian political character? Did they have legitimate concerns about a radicalized Iran and Afghanistan having a negative influence on Soviet Muslim minorities located in Central Asia? Should the United States and NATO have similar concerns regarding Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia?
Self-assessment
1. Instead of relying on the full Politboro to make decisions related to the perceived emergency in Afghanistan, Brezhnev created a “small Politboro.” Who were the members of this select group?
a. Andropov, KGB
b. Ustinov, Minister of Defense
c. Gromoko, Foreeign Minister
d. All of the above
2. In which countries did Yuri Andropov gain the experience he used in his decision-making that led to the Afghanistan invasion?
a. Cuba and the Dominican republis
b. Pakistan and Afghanistan
c. Egypt and Somalia
d. Hungary and Czechoslovakia
3. Who was the American president at the time of the Soviet invasion?
a. Ronald Reagan
b. Theodore Roosevelt
c. Jimmy Carter
d. Harry Truman
4. A military professional, Soviet Chief of General Staff N.V. Ogarkov, attempted to caution the “small Politboro,” but he was ignored. What was his warning?
a. An invasion could precipitate World war III
b. Strategic bombing and the creation of a “no-fly zone” would accomplish Soviet objectives
c. Insufficient troops had been allocated for this mission
d. Economic sanctions should be tried
5. The radicalization of a nearby country following an Islamic revolution was a critical factor in the Soviet decision to move into Afghanistan. Which country was this?
a. Turkey
b. Iran
c. Pakistan
d. Lebanon
6. Following ten years of conflict, the decision was made to leave Afghanistan was made. Which leader made this decision?
a. Gromoko
b. Gorbachev
c. Khruschev
d. Stalin
7. In 1985, Gorbachev gave the Soviet military one year in which to show progress. What was their response?
a. A surge
b. Economic sanctions
c. Withdrawal of combat forces into Afghanistan’s major cities
d. Requests fro NATO assistance
8. During which year did the Soviet Union withdraw its combat troops from Afganistan?
a. 1979
b. 2001
c. 1987
d. 1945
9. In which year did the Arab extremists in Afghanistan and pakistan start serious military training?
a. 1979
b. 2001
c. 1987
d. 1945
10. Which formerly allied Musllim nations expelled the Soviets to create suspicion that Afghanistan’s President Amin might follow a similar course of action?
a. Egypt and Somalia
b. India and Pakistan
c. Iran and Turkey
d. England and France
Optional Graduate Student Paper
During the nineteenth century, imperial powers Great Britain and Russia began to compete for primacy in Central Asia in an episode of history popularly called the “Great Game.” Russian forces expanded their control into the eastern regions of their country, absorbing Muslim states as they did so. Simultaneously, British forces in India extended their control westward and even temporarily gained control of Afghanistan as both sides sought to gain control of strategic areas and resources at the expense of the other. How has this same pattern of “competition” for control of this regions resources and transportation routes served to rejuvenate the “Great Game.” Who are the key players and what resources are being contested? Where are the key lines of communication? Have these changed dramatically from the original “Great Game?”
Optional Honors Competition Paper
[All students are invited to participate in a competition among themselves regarding the most significant paper -- of any length -- that most fully addresses the following:]
Ibn Khaldun long ago described the state of tension that existed between nomad tribes and tribal populations that developed fixed communities and sedentary lifestyles. He explained that raiding tribes often made up economic shortfalls in their available resources by raiding settlements and taking whatever they needed. They frequently settled into the captured towns and cities while often assuming the sedentary lifestyles of those people they recently displaced until they were raided in a continuing cycle of invasions.
As a result of this conflict between raiding tribes and settled populations that normally became detribalized through intermarriage between mixed populations, two separate views of governance began t evolve. Cities and towns tend to rely upon the stability of a hierarchial system from a ruling family or class while tribes tend to be far more egalitarian with small bands of the same tribe having individual leaders who shared governance responsibilities of the entire tribe. Settled populations were ruled top-down while nomad tribes tended to govern themselves in a bottom-up manner. In many ways, Afghanistan developed its form of government along the same lines with urban “centralizers” opposed by independent tribes determined to remain decentralized.
The first serious attempt at imposing the “top-down model” on Afghanistan’s ethnic groups and tribes began in 1973 when Mohammad Daud over threw the monarchy under Zahir Shah. Centralizing efforts continued for two decades under Taraki, Amin, Karmal, and Najibullah, the communists, and continued under the victorious Seven Party Alliance, the Mujahedin government. Mojededdi and Rabbani failed to construct a strong central government and the resulting civil war with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was not helpful in their efforts to do so. The Taliban under Mullah Mohammad Omar were next to take a turn at creating a strong central government through the imposition of Shari’a, Islamic law, but they had failed well before the 2001 American attacks.
Ironically, American and European forces and their political leaders have resumed this exact same policy of forcing a strong central government upon resisting rural tribal populations. This continuing failed apparent fool’s errand is now in its fourth decade.
– Do you believe this “tribal analysis” of Afghanistan’s political situation to be correct? If so, explain how the western allies of the current government of Afghanistan may be able to capitalize upon these tribal dynamics to stabilize Afghanistan.
– If you believe this analysis to be incorrect, explain the current Afghanistan reality in terms of histroy, politics, and conflict while explaining how your approach could be utilized to stabilize Afghanistan.
[Course participants and instructors will serve as jurors and vote for winners of the Honor's Competition]